A militarily degraded Iran may turn to asymmetrical warfare raising risk of proxy and cyber attacks
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Adjunct Lecturer Pennsylvania State University Penn State
ppThe views conclusions and recommendations in this article are the authors own and do not reflect those of the US government ppppPenn State provides funding as a founding partner of The Conversation USppView all partnersppIsraels air assault on Iran has focused largely on degrading the Islamic Republics military and wouldbe nuclear capabilitiesppIn the space of several days Israel has totally or partially destroyed at least two nuclear sites destroyed numerous air defense capabilities in a number of cities and killed at least 14 nuclear scientists and several senior leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsppThe Israeli operation has compromised how Iran can wage conventional warfare through the use of military hardware missiles drones and aircraft It has also likely curtailed any progress Iranian scientists had made in enriching uranium to a weaponslevel grade at least in the shorttermppBut conventional military weapons are only one tool in Tehrans arsenal As a researcher who studies how Iran partners with militant groups I know Iran still has the means to target its enemies Despite the degradation of its military capabilities Iran can leverage proxies criminal organizations abroad and cyberattacks to hit Israeli and possibly US targetsppThe Islamic Republic is well suited for asymmetric warfare or conflict between two countries that have different conventional capabilities and that is below the threshold of conventional war ppIt fits a central tenet of Irans forward deterrence policy In short the doctrine holds that Iran should target its adversaries before their threat reaches the countrys borders As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said in 2019 Iran must not limit ourselves within our own borders It is our duty to recognize and confront threats that lie beyond our wallsppThe forward deterrence doctrine was seeded from the early days of Irans Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution ppNotably forward deterrence originated from a need to cultivate proxies to target Saddam Hussein during the brutal eightyear war Iran fought against Iraq in the 1980s To that end Iran raised equipped and trained groups like the Badr Corps to support its fight against Hussein and it continues to support the militia and its political arm to the present dayppIn more recent years Iran has cultivated violent nonstate actors like terrorist and rebel groups as well as criminal gangs to target adversaries both the US and Israel but also regional rival Saudi Arabia These nonstate groups are primarily coordinated through the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force its extraterritorial missions arm founded in 1988ppRecent Israeli strikes have degraded both Irans conventional military capability and killed members of Revolutionary Guard leadership Israel also allegedly hit a Quds Force nerve center in Tehran and its unclear if its leader Esmail Qaani is dead ppMeanwhile operations earlier in the IsraelGaza conflict have diminished the ability for some of Tehrans proxies notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to respond ppYet Tehrans overall capacity for asymmetric retaliation has not been completely diminished While its unclear how large the Quds Force is by its very nature its operatives are spread throughout the region As a hierarchical bureaucratic organization it likely has a robust succession planppAnd its existing programs directives and operatives will remain in place to be deployed or activatedppOf primary concern to policymakers in Israel and Washington will be the potential targeting of US and Israeli assets abroad through Irans use of criminal organizations and proxies as well as via Quds Force and Ministry of Intelligence operatives deployed throughout the world ppSince the Islamic Republics inception it has targeted perceived enemies and political dissidents in assassinations perpetrated by these proxies and government operatives In 1980 a former Iranian diplomat turned dissident Ali Akbar Tabatabai was assassinated in Maryland by a purported Iranian intelligencelinked network one of the first known Iranianbacked killings on US soil In 1991 the intelligence ministry was accused of orchestrating the assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in France reflecting Tehrans policy of eliminating opposition leaders in exileppA more recent example is Masih Alinejad a NewYork based critic of Tehrans treatment of women who US prosecutors say has been the target of numerous kidnapping and assassination plots involving both Iranian operatives and an Eastern European organized crime group hired by TehranppIran also reportedly cooperates with criminal groups in Europe working with them to surveil Israeli targets in France Germany and the UKppUS nationals have also been targeted directly Iranian intelligence operatives were said to be behind the abduction of former FBI agent Robert Levinson in March 2007 for exampleppAnd in 2022 a member of Irans Quds Force was indicted in the US for plotting to assassinate former National Security Advisor John Bolton ppThe size and number of operatives abroad of both the Quds Force and the Ministry of Intelligences operatives are classified but estimates put the Ministry of Intelligence at around 30000 personnel and the Quds Force at anything from 10000 to 21000ppRegionally a key aspect of Irans forward deterrence doctrine has centered on the socalled Axis of Resistance which includes groups like Hamas Hezbollah and the Houthis These forces have targeted US and Israeli interests abroad including in a number of highprofile terrorist attacks ppCharacterizing the Axis of Resistance as mere proxies of Iranian foreign policy oversimplifies matters In reality the Axis comprises a complex network of strategic partnerships with ideologically aligned but autonomous groups each with its own agenda local support base and relationship with TehranppSince its inception in the early 1980s Lebanons Hezbollah has been seen to be Irans most reliable proxy when attacking US or Israeli targets Hezbollahs external operations arm Islamic Jihad Organization was thought to be responsible for the 1983 US embassy and Marine barracks bombing in Beirut which left over 300 dead collectivelyppSimilarly prosecutors in Argentina believe Iran sponsored and Hezbollah carried out the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires which left 85 dead Similar efforts have been disrupted in Azerbaijan Bulgaria and ThailandppWhile Hezbollah had amassed a large arsenal and regional strength over the last two decades its capabilities have been severely hampered by recent Israeli efforts which saw many of the groups top brass killed And it is notable that Hezbollah has not launched any strikes on Israels north in concert with Irans efforts to counter Israels most recent offensiveppUnlike Hezbollah or Hamas the Houthis in Yemen remain largely undiminished in regards to their offensive capabilitiesppOn June 13 the Houthis launched missiles against Israel in response to the attack on Iran ppThe Houthis have the capability to severely disrupt shipping in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz a crucial waterway for global shippingppFor months after October 2023 the Houthis targeted commercial ships in the Red Sea These attacks drove up shipping costs and led to US and other navies escorting ships exchanging fire and finally a USled bombing of Houthis in late 2023 and early 2024ppFinally Iran also has alliances with a series of smaller proxies in Iraq and Syria that could be deployed against US diplomatic and military targets in the region One such group was behind the deadly bombing of a US military base in Jordan that killed three US soldiers in January 2024ppAnother potential avenue of retaliation for Iran is a cyberattack conducted either directly or through a proxy groupppCybersecurity firm Radware noted a reported 700 spike in malicious online activity in the two days following the launch of the recent Israel operation which it blamed on Iranian state actors and proIranian hacker groups ppCyberoperations are embedded in Irans broader forward deterrence doctrine ppOver the years Tehran has built up a network of hacking groups to conduct reconnaissance disinformation data theft sabotage and influence operations Meanwhile Iran is increasingly integrating AI tools into its cyberarsenal making operations more agile effective and less costly After the Oct 7 2023 attack by Hamas for example Iranianbacked cyberactors used AI tools to generate propaganda imagery aimed at influencing Israeli public sentimentppThen following Irans April 2024 drone strike on Israel Iranianbacked cyberactors employed AI to create fabricated video clips and images falsely depicting rockets and subsequent explosions launched into the night These visuals were shared via platforms like X and were aimed at amplifying fear among IsraelisppAs the conventional warfare between Israel and Iran continues to downgrade Tehrans military capabilities the risk of asymmetric retaliation growsppAnd Irans network of operatives proxies and cyber actors may be harder to hit than stationary launching sites and military headquarters They remain active and capable even amid military degradation and leadership lossesppThe more Tehran is pressured through direct strikes the more likely it is to turn to these unconventional warfare tools Although less visible Irans unconventional warfare arsenal is a potentially dangerous dimension of this conflictpp
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Copyright 20102025 The Conversation US Inc
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Adjunct Lecturer Pennsylvania State University Penn State
ppThe views conclusions and recommendations in this article are the authors own and do not reflect those of the US government ppppPenn State provides funding as a founding partner of The Conversation USppView all partnersppIsraels air assault on Iran has focused largely on degrading the Islamic Republics military and wouldbe nuclear capabilitiesppIn the space of several days Israel has totally or partially destroyed at least two nuclear sites destroyed numerous air defense capabilities in a number of cities and killed at least 14 nuclear scientists and several senior leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsppThe Israeli operation has compromised how Iran can wage conventional warfare through the use of military hardware missiles drones and aircraft It has also likely curtailed any progress Iranian scientists had made in enriching uranium to a weaponslevel grade at least in the shorttermppBut conventional military weapons are only one tool in Tehrans arsenal As a researcher who studies how Iran partners with militant groups I know Iran still has the means to target its enemies Despite the degradation of its military capabilities Iran can leverage proxies criminal organizations abroad and cyberattacks to hit Israeli and possibly US targetsppThe Islamic Republic is well suited for asymmetric warfare or conflict between two countries that have different conventional capabilities and that is below the threshold of conventional war ppIt fits a central tenet of Irans forward deterrence policy In short the doctrine holds that Iran should target its adversaries before their threat reaches the countrys borders As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said in 2019 Iran must not limit ourselves within our own borders It is our duty to recognize and confront threats that lie beyond our wallsppThe forward deterrence doctrine was seeded from the early days of Irans Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution ppNotably forward deterrence originated from a need to cultivate proxies to target Saddam Hussein during the brutal eightyear war Iran fought against Iraq in the 1980s To that end Iran raised equipped and trained groups like the Badr Corps to support its fight against Hussein and it continues to support the militia and its political arm to the present dayppIn more recent years Iran has cultivated violent nonstate actors like terrorist and rebel groups as well as criminal gangs to target adversaries both the US and Israel but also regional rival Saudi Arabia These nonstate groups are primarily coordinated through the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force its extraterritorial missions arm founded in 1988ppRecent Israeli strikes have degraded both Irans conventional military capability and killed members of Revolutionary Guard leadership Israel also allegedly hit a Quds Force nerve center in Tehran and its unclear if its leader Esmail Qaani is dead ppMeanwhile operations earlier in the IsraelGaza conflict have diminished the ability for some of Tehrans proxies notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to respond ppYet Tehrans overall capacity for asymmetric retaliation has not been completely diminished While its unclear how large the Quds Force is by its very nature its operatives are spread throughout the region As a hierarchical bureaucratic organization it likely has a robust succession planppAnd its existing programs directives and operatives will remain in place to be deployed or activatedppOf primary concern to policymakers in Israel and Washington will be the potential targeting of US and Israeli assets abroad through Irans use of criminal organizations and proxies as well as via Quds Force and Ministry of Intelligence operatives deployed throughout the world ppSince the Islamic Republics inception it has targeted perceived enemies and political dissidents in assassinations perpetrated by these proxies and government operatives In 1980 a former Iranian diplomat turned dissident Ali Akbar Tabatabai was assassinated in Maryland by a purported Iranian intelligencelinked network one of the first known Iranianbacked killings on US soil In 1991 the intelligence ministry was accused of orchestrating the assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in France reflecting Tehrans policy of eliminating opposition leaders in exileppA more recent example is Masih Alinejad a NewYork based critic of Tehrans treatment of women who US prosecutors say has been the target of numerous kidnapping and assassination plots involving both Iranian operatives and an Eastern European organized crime group hired by TehranppIran also reportedly cooperates with criminal groups in Europe working with them to surveil Israeli targets in France Germany and the UKppUS nationals have also been targeted directly Iranian intelligence operatives were said to be behind the abduction of former FBI agent Robert Levinson in March 2007 for exampleppAnd in 2022 a member of Irans Quds Force was indicted in the US for plotting to assassinate former National Security Advisor John Bolton ppThe size and number of operatives abroad of both the Quds Force and the Ministry of Intelligences operatives are classified but estimates put the Ministry of Intelligence at around 30000 personnel and the Quds Force at anything from 10000 to 21000ppRegionally a key aspect of Irans forward deterrence doctrine has centered on the socalled Axis of Resistance which includes groups like Hamas Hezbollah and the Houthis These forces have targeted US and Israeli interests abroad including in a number of highprofile terrorist attacks ppCharacterizing the Axis of Resistance as mere proxies of Iranian foreign policy oversimplifies matters In reality the Axis comprises a complex network of strategic partnerships with ideologically aligned but autonomous groups each with its own agenda local support base and relationship with TehranppSince its inception in the early 1980s Lebanons Hezbollah has been seen to be Irans most reliable proxy when attacking US or Israeli targets Hezbollahs external operations arm Islamic Jihad Organization was thought to be responsible for the 1983 US embassy and Marine barracks bombing in Beirut which left over 300 dead collectivelyppSimilarly prosecutors in Argentina believe Iran sponsored and Hezbollah carried out the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires which left 85 dead Similar efforts have been disrupted in Azerbaijan Bulgaria and ThailandppWhile Hezbollah had amassed a large arsenal and regional strength over the last two decades its capabilities have been severely hampered by recent Israeli efforts which saw many of the groups top brass killed And it is notable that Hezbollah has not launched any strikes on Israels north in concert with Irans efforts to counter Israels most recent offensiveppUnlike Hezbollah or Hamas the Houthis in Yemen remain largely undiminished in regards to their offensive capabilitiesppOn June 13 the Houthis launched missiles against Israel in response to the attack on Iran ppThe Houthis have the capability to severely disrupt shipping in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz a crucial waterway for global shippingppFor months after October 2023 the Houthis targeted commercial ships in the Red Sea These attacks drove up shipping costs and led to US and other navies escorting ships exchanging fire and finally a USled bombing of Houthis in late 2023 and early 2024ppFinally Iran also has alliances with a series of smaller proxies in Iraq and Syria that could be deployed against US diplomatic and military targets in the region One such group was behind the deadly bombing of a US military base in Jordan that killed three US soldiers in January 2024ppAnother potential avenue of retaliation for Iran is a cyberattack conducted either directly or through a proxy groupppCybersecurity firm Radware noted a reported 700 spike in malicious online activity in the two days following the launch of the recent Israel operation which it blamed on Iranian state actors and proIranian hacker groups ppCyberoperations are embedded in Irans broader forward deterrence doctrine ppOver the years Tehran has built up a network of hacking groups to conduct reconnaissance disinformation data theft sabotage and influence operations Meanwhile Iran is increasingly integrating AI tools into its cyberarsenal making operations more agile effective and less costly After the Oct 7 2023 attack by Hamas for example Iranianbacked cyberactors used AI tools to generate propaganda imagery aimed at influencing Israeli public sentimentppThen following Irans April 2024 drone strike on Israel Iranianbacked cyberactors employed AI to create fabricated video clips and images falsely depicting rockets and subsequent explosions launched into the night These visuals were shared via platforms like X and were aimed at amplifying fear among IsraelisppAs the conventional warfare between Israel and Iran continues to downgrade Tehrans military capabilities the risk of asymmetric retaliation growsppAnd Irans network of operatives proxies and cyber actors may be harder to hit than stationary launching sites and military headquarters They remain active and capable even amid military degradation and leadership lossesppThe more Tehran is pressured through direct strikes the more likely it is to turn to these unconventional warfare tools Although less visible Irans unconventional warfare arsenal is a potentially dangerous dimension of this conflictpp
Write an article and join a growing community of more than 206800 academics and researchers from 5246 institutions
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